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NOTES
NO  INTERNET  DOES  NOT  MEAN  NO
PROTECTION  UNDER  THE  CFAA:  WHY
VOTING  MACHINES  SHOULD  BE  COVERED
UNDER  18  U.S.C.  § 1030
Jack Dahm*
[T]hese [cyberattacks] are persistent, they are pervasive, and they are meant to undermine
America’s democracy on a daily basis, regardless of whether it is election time or not.  Russian
actors and others are exploring vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure as well. . . . The
warning signs are there, the system is blinking, and that is why I believe we are at a critical
point.
—Dan Coats, Director of U.S. National Intelligence,
July 13, 20181
INTRODUCTION
The threat of cyberattacks to America’s networks is ever increasing.2
Dan Coats, the Director of U.S. National Intelligence, addressed this prob-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Bachelor of Science in
Business, Miami University, 2015; Bachelor of Arts in English, Miami University, 2015.  I
would like to thank Professor Patricia Bellia for her guidance throughout the Note writing
process.  I would also like to thank the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their careful
editing.  Finally, a special thanks to Lainie Lynch, who is my greatest supporter in
everything I do.  All errors are my own.
1 Dan Coats, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Address at Hudson Institute (July 13, 2018)
[hereinafter Dan Coats Address].  For a transcript of the address, see Transcript: Dan Coats
Warns the Lights Are ‘Blinking Red’ on Russian Cyberattacks, NPR (July 18, 2018), https://www
.npr.org/2018/07/18/630164914/transcript-dan-coats-warns-of-continuing-russian-
cyberattacks.
2 See Dan Coats Address, supra note 1; see also Grant Schneider, President Trump
Unveils America’s First Cybersecurity Strategy in 15 Years, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 20, 2018), https:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/articles/president-trump-unveils-americas-first-cybersecurity-strat-
egy-15-years/ (describing the “growing threats” by criminals, terrorists, and foreign adver-
saries to America’s networks).
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lem in a speech before the Hudson Institute3 on July 13, 2018.4  Coats recal-
led the months before September 2001, when then-current CIA Director
George Tenet said, “the system was blinking red.”5  Coats then alerted the
Hudson Institute, “I’m here to say the warning lights are blinking red again.
Today, the digital infrastructure that serves this country is literally under
attack.”6  Coats identified Russia as being “the most aggressive foreign
actor—no question.”7  Russia has become a global force in cyber warfare.8
So far, the biggest target of their attacks has been the 2016 U.S. election.9
Largely in response to Russia’s cyberattacks and continued cyberthreats,
the U.S. Attorney General established a Cyber-Digital Task Force within the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in February 2018.10  This newly created task
force released its first public report on July 19, 2018.11  Then–Attorney Gen-
eral Jeff Sessions announced the release of the report, while promising that
“[a]t the Department of Justice, we take these threats seriously.”12  The
report was designed to answer the following question: “How is the Depart-
ment [of Justice] responding to cyber threats?”13  The report begins by dis-
cussing the threat of foreign influence operations, described by the Task
Force as “one of the most pressing cyber-enabled threats our Nation faces.”14
Specifically, the Task Force focuses on the dangerous threat of Russia to U.S.
elections.15
3 A think tank and research center dedicated to nonpartisan analysis of U.S. and
international economic, security, and political issues. See generally HUDSON INSTITUTE,
https://www.hudson.org/about (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
4 Dan Coats Address, supra note 1.
5 Id. (referring to intelligence communications identifying alarming activities that
suggested a potential attack before 9/11).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Sophie Perryer, A History of Russian Hacking, NEW ECON. (Oct. 22, 2018), https://
www.theneweconomy.com/technology/a-history-of-russian-hacking.
9 Id. (describing Russia’s attempts to alter the outcome of the 2016 U.S. election
through cyber hacking as “their biggest task yet”).  Russia’s cyber interference during the
election included “systematic distribution of ‘fake news’ on social media sites, alleged
financial contributions to Trump’s campaign, and—the centerpiece of their interfer-
ence—a phishing attack on Hillary Clinton’s campaign.” Id.
10 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL TASK
FORCE (2018), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1076696/download [hereinafter
DOJ CYBER DIGITAL REPORT].
11 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Announces Publica-
tion of Cyber-Digital Task Force Report (July 19, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
attorney-general-sessions-announces-publication-cyber-digital-task-force-report.
12 Id.
13 DOJ CYBER DIGITAL REPORT, supra note 10, at xi.  This is one of the two foundational
questions that were given to the Task Force by the Attorney General.  The other question
is: “And how can federal law enforcement more effectively accomplish its mission in this
important and rapidly evolving area?” Id.
14 Id. This section makes up the first chapter of the report. See id. at 1–21.
15 Id. at 2.  The report calls out Russia’s “longstanding desire to undermine the U.S.-
led liberal democratic order.” Id. (quoting OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE,
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After detailing the scope of this and other threats, the Task Force out-
lines the key prosecutorial tools available to the DOJ in combating cyberat-
tacks.16  The first tool, which this Note will discuss at length, is the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030.17  The CFAA falls
at the top of the Task Force’s list because, as it mentions, “[the CFAA]
remains the . . . principal tool for prosecuting computer crimes.”18  Many
other scholars have described the CFAA as the cornerstone of computer
fraud litigation.19  The Task Force provides a simple definition of the CFAA,
explaining how it “gives the owners of computers the right to control who
may access their computers, take information from them, change how the
computers work, or delete information on them.”20
Later in the report, after emphasizing Russian interference with elec-
tions as the principal cyberthreat and the CFAA as the principal prosecution
tool, the Task Force asserts that “[the CFAA] currently does not prohibit the
act of hacking a voting machine in many common situations.”21  The Task
Force plainly states that “the CFAA only prohibits hacking computers that are
connected to the Internet (or that meet other narrow criteria for protec-
tion).”22  However, the text of the CFAA does not explicitly require that
hacked computers be connected to the internet, nor have the courts inter-
preted this as a requirement of the CFAA.23  Though most of Russia’s known
cyberthreats have not been aimed directly at the voting machine devices
themselves, the Task Force’s assertion still raises a big question: Does the
CFAA only apply to internet-connected devices?
This Note seeks to answer that question, ultimately concluding that
internet connection is not required for a computer to reach protected status
under the CFAA.  Part I of this Note describes the background of the CFAA,
specifically detailing the types of crime it was meant to punish, its definition
of “computer,” and its definition of “protected computer” (which builds on
the definition of “computer” by providing the jurisdictional hook).  Part II
moves away from the Act’s legislative history and discusses how courts have
interpreted the CFAA over time.  Part III applies the CFAA to the hacking of
a voting machine (assumed to be without internet).  Here, a voting machine
is used as the vehicle for the analysis but much of the reasoning could apply
BACKGROUND TO “ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELEC-
TIONS”: THE ANALYTIC PROCESS AND CYBER INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION 1 (2017)).
16 Id. at 62.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?”–A Primer on
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Civil Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV. 141, 154 (2011) (“Practi-
cally speaking, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is the king of all computer fraud
laws.”).
20 DOJ CYBER DIGITAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 62.
21 Id. at 121.
22 Id.
23 See Orin Kerr (@OrinKerr), TWITTER (Aug. 29, 2018, 12:36 AM), https://twitter
.com/OrinKerr/status/1034706398.
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to other non-internet-connected devices.  Part III argues that the hacking of
a voting machine is certainly within the current-day scope of crimes meant to
be punished by the CFAA, that voting machines fall within the Act’s defini-
tion of “computer,” and that voting machines probably fall within the defini-
tion of “protected computer.”  From there, the Conclusion explains why an
amendment to expressly add voting machines to the definition of the CFAA
would not be the best solution (especially since they are likely already pro-
tected).  The Conclusion then analyzes the risks of the continuing expansion
of the CFAA’s scope and addresses the relative potential of Russia’s cyber-
threats to voting machines compared to their other election-related
cyberthreats.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE CFAA
The CFAA is only thirty-two years old, having been passed in 1986 as an
amendment to the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1984.24  The legislative history of the CFAA shows that Congress
wanted “to provide a clear statement of proscribed activity . . . to the law
enforcement community, those who own and operate computers and those
tempted to commit crimes by unauthorized access.”25  Since 1986, Congress
has amended the CFAA eight more times.26  Each of these several amend-
ments has “widened the depth and breadth of the Act by adding substantive
offenses, lowering levels of scienter, or increasing penalties.”27  Congress will
assuredly continue to amend the CFAA given the rapid increase in technol-
ogy development.  Because there have been so many changes to the CFAA,
this Part does not offer a comprehensive review of all of the amendments,
but it will highlight a few of the important changes and present the law as it
stands today.
A. The Substantive Crime: 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)
The CFAA is meant to prevent “fraud and related activity in connection
with computers.”28  The requisite mens rea for the crime is “intentionally,”29
thus the Act is meant to punish only the most culpable actors.  The actual
substance of the crime has evolved with time as Congress has continually
24 Tuma, supra note 19, at 155.
25 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 3 (1996)).
26 Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond WarGames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Should Be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 405, 414
(2012).  The five most substantial amendments include the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, the USA Patriot Act of 2001, and the Identity Theft Enforcement
and Restitution Act of 2008. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1564–71 (2010).
27 Kapitanyan, supra note 26, at 415 (citing Reid Skibell, Note, Cybercrimes & Misde-
meanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 911
(2003)).
28 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
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amended the Act and technology has substantially changed.30  The amend-
ment process started with the CFAA itself when it expanded the scope of the
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
which was strictly designed to protect information, records, and computers
used by the U.S. government.31  The 1986 amendment did not remove the
language of the original statute, but simply expanded its scope.  Therefore,
portions of the Act still reflect its original, more narrow intent from back in
1984.32  Today, far beyond preventing only the hacking of computers belong-
ing to the U.S. government, the Act prevents the hacking of “any protected
computer,”33 a definition that will be further discussed in Sections II.B and
II.C.
While the Act has broadened to cover the hacking of more types of com-
puters, it has remained fairly consistent in defining what it means to hack a
computer (though the courts have interpreted this definition of hacking in
different ways).34  A hacking worthy of punishment under the CFAA involves
a person who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information.”35  The key
words from this definition, which have triggered much legal argument, are
“without authorization or exceeds authorized access.”  Congress attempted to
aid the courts in understanding these words by providing a definition of
“exceeds authorized access,” which reads: “[T]o access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”36  However,
this definition is rather circular and does not provide additional context
beyond the text of the phrase itself.  On top of that, Congress has never
defined “without authorization.”  Therefore, it has largely been up to the
courts to answer the following questions: What does it mean to access a com-
puter without authorization?  What does it mean to exceed authorized
access?  The courts’ answers to these questions bear important weight, as they
directly influence the scope of the substantive crime.
It is worth briefly noting the varying degrees of punishment for offenses
committed under the CFAA.  Based on the severity of the offense, a criminal
defendant might receive a fine under the title of the Act, a prison sentence
29 Id. Initially, the mens rea had been “knowingly.” See Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213, 1213–16 (1986) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
30 Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1442 (2016).
31 Id. at 1443.
32 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) specifically refers to hacking of information
“that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive
order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of
national defense or foreign relations.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (2012).
33 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
34 See infra Section II.A.
35 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
36 Id. § 1030(e)(6).
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ranging from not more than one year to not more than twenty years, or possi-
bly both a fine and prison sentence.37  The upward bound of twenty years in
prison illustrates the gravity of potential offenses committed under the Act.
The full punishment scheme is laid out in subsection (c) of the Act.38  Ini-
tially, the CFAA was only a criminal statute, but Congress later expanded it to
allow for recovery of civil damages as well.39
B. The Definition of “Computer”: 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)
While the meaning of the phrase “without authorization or exceeds
authorized access” greatly influences what actions are considered criminal
under the Act, there can be no criminal action under the CFAA without the
involvement of a computer.  Again, this statute was conceived back in the
1980s, when computers were very different from what they are now.  Aside
from the enormous advancements with regard to the traditional computer,
the breadth of computer-like devices has extraordinarily widened and contin-
ues to do so with time.  Thus, determining “what is a computer,” is not as easy
as it might seem.  Here is how Congress currently defines “computer” under
the CFAA:
[A]n electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed
data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions,
and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly
related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does
not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held cal-
culator, or other similar device.40
  The wordiness of this definition reflects the difficulty of defining a current-
day (and future-day) computer.  Given the vast range of computer-like
devices, Congress chose to offer examples of what a computer is not.  The
examples provide concrete clarification, as they allow lawyers and judges to
materially distinguish between a “maybe computer” and the explicit “not
computers” put forth by Congress.
But on the whole, the definition of “computer” is broad and unlikely to
be at issue.  In fact, the Seventh Circuit Committee on Federal Criminal Jury
Instructions anticipated that “in most cases, it will be unnecessary to instruct
the jury on the meaning of the term ‘computer.’”41  Legal scholars seem to
agree.  In a 2010 law review article, Professor Orin Kerr said that this broad
construction allows for nearly every computer to be protected under the Act,
to the point where a protected computer can include “coffeemakers, micro-
wave ovens, watches, telephones, children’s toys, MP3 players, refrigerators,
heating and air-conditioning units, radios, alarm clocks, televisions, and DVD
37 Id. § 1030(c).
38 See id.
39 Tuma, supra note 19, at 155.
40 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).
41 PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 384 (COMM. ON FED.
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 2012).
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players, in addition to more traditional computers like laptops or desktop
computers.”42  Because all of these devices contain microchips and electronic
storage devices, they are likely to satisfy the definition.43
C. The Definition of “Protected Computer”: 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)
  Meeting the definition of “computer” does not end the analysis.  With the
passage of the Economic Espionage Act in 1996, Congress added the require-
ment that the computer also be “protected.”44  There are two categories of
“protected computers.”  The first category includes computers involving a
financial institution or the United States government.45  Whether a com-
puter is protected under this first category is fairly straightforward.  The sec-
ond category includes computers that are used in or affect interstate or
foreign commerce or communication.46  The section of the Act that gives
effect to this second category of protected computers reads: “[U]sed in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a
computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United
States.”47
Initially, the second category only covered computers used in interstate
or foreign commerce, and not those affecting such commerce.48  When Con-
gress first added the “protected computer” category to the Act as part of the
Economic Espionage Act in 1996, the Senate Judiciary Committee said, “[it]
is intended to protect against the interstate or foreign theft of information by
computer.”49  In 2008, Congress added the phrase “affecting interstate com-
merce” to align the CFAA’s jurisdiction with the breadth of the Commerce
Clause.50  In other words, the phrase “affecting interstate commerce” is
meant to invoke Congress’s full sphere of power under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.  Essentially, the Constitution does not give Con-
gress the right to regulate computers, but it does provide Congress with the
ability to regulate interstate or foreign commerce.51  In this scenario, by
requiring that computers affect interstate or foreign commerce in order to
42 Kerr, supra note 26, at 1577–78.
43 Id.
44 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, § 201, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030)).
45 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A).
46 Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
47 Id.
48 Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 201.
49 William A. Hall, Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s Deficient Examination of the Legislative History of
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in United States v. Nosal, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1523,
1539–40 (2016) (emphasis omitted) (citing S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7 (1996)).
50 Tiffany Curtiss, Comment, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Enforcement: Cruel, Unusual,
and Due for Reform, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1818 (2016).
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (stating that the United States Congress shall have
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes”).
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be protected, Congress was able to use the commerce power to regulate this
area of the law.
The Supreme Court greatly expanded the scope of “affecting com-
merce” when it decided Wickard v. Filburn in 1942.52  This case involved a
statute passed by Congress under the commerce power, which limited wheat
production for farmers based on their total farm acreage.53  Ohio farmer
Roscoe Filburn harvested 239 wheat bushels in excess of his limit under the
statute, though he intended to use the extra wheat for home consumption.54
Having exceeded his quota, Filburn sought to enjoin enforcement of the
marketing penalty that he faced under the statute.55  Filburn argued that
Congress’s regulation of wheat production for home consumption exceeded
the scope of its power under the Commerce Clause.56  But ultimately, Justice
Jackson said that an activity may “be reached by Congress if it exerts a sub-
stantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as
‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’”57
More recently, and largely relying on the reasoning from Wickard, the
Supreme Court upheld this “indirect effects” interpretation of the commerce
power in Gonzales v. Raich.58 Gonzales involved a statute passed by Congress
under the commerce power, which limited the use of marijuana.59  Respon-
dents Raich and Monson sought injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting
enforcement of the law as applied to personal medical marijuana use.60  Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for the majority, explained how the respondents’ usage
of homegrown medical marijuana could still affect the broader interstate
marijuana market, just as Filburn’s extra wheat for homegrown consumption
posed indirect effects on interstate commerce.61  Specifically, Stevens wrote,
“While the diversion of homegrown wheat tended to frustrate the federal
interest in stabilizing prices by regulating the volume of commercial transac-
tions in the interstate market, the diversion of homegrown marijuana tends
to frustrate the federal interest in eliminating commercial transactions in the
interstate market in their entirety.”62
52 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
53 Id. at 114.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 114–15.
57 Id. at 125.
58 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
59 Id. at 14.
60 Id. at 6–7.
61 Id. at 19.
62 Id.
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II. THE COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CFAA
While a substantial number of courts have applied the CFAA, the
Supreme Court has yet to do so.63  This has led to uncertainty in the law,
especially with regard to the reach of the substantive crime.  This Part pro-
vides a brief analysis of how the U.S. courts of appeals have interpreted the
scope of “without authorization or exceeds authorized access.”  Thereafter,
this Part discusses how the U.S. courts of appeals have interpreted the defini-
tion of “computer” over time.  This Part concludes by showing how U.S.
courts of appeals have interpreted the reach of “affecting interstate or for-
eign commerce,” one of the controlling phrases in determining whether a
computer is protected under the Act.
A. The Circuit Split Regarding 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a): “Without Authorization”
The circuit split regarding the meaning of “without authorization” has
been the subject of many journal articles,64 given the divisiveness of the vary-
ing interpretations and the resulting friction that this divide has created for
legal practitioners and the lower courts.  Putting it bluntly, Professor Orin
Kerr has said that “[n]o one knows what it means to ‘access’ a computer . . .
or when access becomes ‘unauthorized.’”65  This Note does not produce an
exhaustive review of the circuit split but simply provides a brief explanation
of the different circuits’ viewpoints and justifications.  Looking at the split
from a sweeping perspective, there are two circuits in particular that have
issued decisions that lie on polar ends of the spectrum: the Seventh Circuit in
International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin66 and the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Nosal.67  In these decisions, the Seventh Circuit employed a broad
interpretation68 while the Ninth Circuit took a narrower approach.69
This Section will first discuss Citrin, as it was decided six years before
Nosal.  In Citrin, the Seventh Circuit held that an employee’s authorization to
access his employer’s computer terminates when he breaches his duty of loy-
63 Tuma, supra note 19, at 154.
64 See, e.g., Laura Bernescu, Note, When Is a Hack Not a Hack: Addressing the CFAA’s
Applicability to the Internet Service Context, 2013 U. CHI. L.F. 633; Ryan E. Dosh, Comment,
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: As Conflict Rages on, The United States v. Nosal Ruling
Provides Employers Clear Guidance, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 901 (2014); Justin Precht, Comment,
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or the Modern Criminal at Work: The Dangers of Facebook from
Your Cubicle, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 359 (2013).
65 Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer
Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1596 (2003).
66 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
67 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
68 See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420.  The Seventh Circuit has been relatively joined by the
First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, all of which have also employed broader interpretations.
Precht, supra note 64, at 362.
69 See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 864.  The Fourth Circuit has also taken a narrow approach.
Precht, supra note 64, at 362.
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alty to his employer.70  This case arose when Jacob Citrin engaged in
improper conduct by taking his employer’s marketing data, deleting the
employer’s copy of the data, resigning from that employer, and starting his
own company.71  Exacerbating the impropriety of Citrin’s conduct, he not
only deleted the employer’s data, but he also made sure it was unrecover-
able.72  Against these facts, the court applied an agency theory.73  The court
reasoned that, once Citrin breached his duty of loyalty by acting against his
employer’s interest, his authorization to access the employer’s data had ter-
minated.74  Thus, Citrin had accessed the employer’s computer “without
authorization” when he took and deleted the data, therefore violating the
CFAA.75
The Ninth Circuit chose not to follow the reasoning of Citrin.76  In
Nosal, the Ninth Circuit decided that the CFAA does not cover employee
hackers or insiders who take data from their employers in violation of a com-
puter-use policy.77  Similar to Citrin, David Nosal decided to leave his com-
pany and start a competing business.78  However, rather than take data from
his previous employer before leaving, Nosal hacked the data after he quit
through inside contacts he still had at the firm.79  These inside contacts all
had authorized access to the employer’s database, but disclosing confidential
information from the database was against the company’s computer-use pol-
icy.80  The government argued that violating an employer’s computer-use
policy constitutes “exceed[ing their] authorized access,” but the court dis-
agreed.81  Relying on the rule of lenity, the court held that this sort of broad
interpretation would “‘delegate to prosecutors and juries the inherently leg-
islative task of determining what type of . . . activities are so morally reprehen-
sible that they should be punished as crimes’ and would ‘subject individuals
to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution and conviction.’”82
Ultimately, the court concluded that the phrase “exceeds authorized access”
70 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21.
71 Complaint at 4–5, Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (No. 03C-8104).
72 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419.
73 Id. at 420–21.  Agency law imposes a duty of loyalty that employees owe to their
employers. Id. at 420.
74 Id.  Judge Posner, who wrote the opinion, explained that Citrin’s only basis of
authority over the laptop had been based on his employment relationship. Id. at 421.
75 Id. at 420.
76 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
77 Id. at 863 (“We therefore respectfully decline to follow our sister circuits and urge
them to reconsider instead.”).
78 Id. at 856.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 856 n.1 (in addition to the policy, “[t]he opening screen of the database also
included the warning: ‘This product is intended to be used by Korn/Ferry employees for
work on Korn/Ferry business only.’”).
81 Id. at 857.
82 Id. at 862 (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931,
949 (1988)).
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in the CFAA does not extend to violations of an employer’s computer-use
policy.83
When Nosal violated his company’s computer-use policy, he breached
his duty of loyalty by acting against his employer’s interest.  Under the Citrin
school of thought, this breach should have revoked his authorization.84  But
as Judge Kozinski pointed out in Nosal, “[i]f Congress meant to expand the
scope of criminal liability to everyone who uses a computer in violation of
computer use restrictions [that] may well include everyone who uses a com-
puter.”85  For example, a company’s computer-use policy might include a
term like “this computer is for business use only.”  Therefore, if an employee
were to check a personal Facebook or Twitter account—or anything per-
sonal, for that matter—that would be a violation of the use policy.  But could
that sort of violation reasonably be considered an offense under the CFAA, a
federal criminal statute?  This concern drove the Ninth Circuit to its nar-
rower approach.
B. The Circuit Courts’ Interpretations of “Computer”
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)
Congress answered “what is a computer” by drafting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(e)(1).  Now, in recent years, the courts have had to answer “is this a
computer” upon hearing cases that bring claims under the CFAA.  In con-
trast from their analysis of “authorization,” the circuit courts have tended to
use similar reasoning in analyzing various computer-like devices under the
text of § 1030(e)(1).
In 2005, the Seventh Circuit held that a computer-based radio system for
police, fire, ambulance, and other emergency communications (referred to
as “Smartnet II”) was a “computer” under § 1030(e)(1) in United States v.
Mitra.86  The case resulted from a radio transmission, sent by the defendant,
which interfered with nineteen other communication channels and thereby
stopped the flow of information among public-safety officials.87  The defen-
dant argued that he could not possibly be convicted under the CFAA, as the
Act is meant to punish crimes like “invad[ing] a bank’s system to steal finan-
cial information, or eras[ing] data on an ex-employer’s system.”88  Essen-
tially, his point was that Congress could not have intended the Act to punish
a transmission sent over public radio.89  The court rejected this argument,
explaining that “[l]egislation is an objective text approved in constitutionally
83 Id. at 863.
84 See Int’l Airport Ctrs. LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006).
85 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857 (Judge Kozinski further explaining that if Congress had
intended this, “we would expect it to use language better suited to that purpose”).
86 405 F.3d 492, 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2005).
87 Id. at 493.  The damage caused by the defendant was the resulting threat to public
health and safety, given that the ability of emergency servicemen to communicate was
impaired. Id.
88 Id. at 495 (citing United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2001)).
89 Id.
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prescribed ways; its scope is not limited by the cerebrations of those who
voted for or signed it into law.”90  The court sharply focused on the language
of § 1030(e)(1) and ultimately declared that a computer-based radio system
is a “computer” under the language set forth by Congress.91  The court
pointed out that, based on this analysis, the effective scope of the Act will
continue to expand as more devices acquire built-in intelligence.92  With
regard to this issue of expanding scope, the court said, “[it] might prompt
Congress to amend the statute but [it] does not authorize the judiciary to
give the existing version less coverage than its language portends.”93
Six years later, in 2011, the Eighth Circuit decided United States v.
Kramer, which involved a criminal claim where the CFAA definition of “com-
puter” was at issue.94  In writing for the court, Judge Wollman began his
opinion by referring to a quote from Steve Wozniak, cofounder of Apple, in
which Wozniak said “Everything has a computer in it nowadays.”95  Wollman
then got to the heart of the issue: “[I]s an ordinary cellular phone—used
only to place calls and send text messages—a computer?”96  Neil Kramer, the
defendant, specifically argued that the the CFAA definition of computer
“should apply only when a device is used to access the Internet.”97  The court
disagreed.98  In justifying its position, the court relied on the exceedingly
broad language of § 1030(e)(1) and asserted that its definition “captures any
device that makes use of a[n] electronic data processor, examples of which
are legion.”99  The court then outright stated, “there is nothing in the statu-
tory definition that purports to exclude devices because they lack a connec-
tion to the Internet.”100  In rounding out its analysis, the court mentioned
that it found few similarities when comparing an automated typewriter and a
handheld calculator (which are explicitly deemed “not computers” in
§ 1030(e)(1)) to a modern cellular phone with an electronic processor.101
Both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have broadly interpreted the defi-
nition of “computer.”102  It is worth noting that in both of these cases, the
90 Id.  The court points out that Congress “has so many brains with so many different
objectives that it is almost facetious to impute a joint goal or purpose to the collectivity.”
Id.
91 Id. at 497.
92 Id. at 495.
93 Id.
94 United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 901 (8th Cir. 2011).




97 Id. at 902.
98 Id.
99 Id. (citing Kerr, supra note 26, at 1577).
100 Id. at 903.
101 Id. at 902.  The court also acknowledged that a “basic” cellular phone might not be
colloquially considered a computer, but that they must consider it a “computer” based on
the definition of the Act, by which they were bound. Id.
102 See id.; United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005).
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device at issue was used for communication (i.e., a cell phone for texting and
calling and a radio for transmitting messages).  However, the courts did not
argue that the devices’ communication abilities were close enough to
internet-like communication, thereby making the devices similar enough to
traditional computers.  Instead, the courts placed more emphasis on the
devices’ electronic data-processing abilities.  This would seem to suggest that,
when deciding what is a “computer,” the ability of a device to electronically
process data is far more determinative than the ability of a device to commu-
nicate with other devices (especially considering that this argument was not
even mentioned).
C. The Circuit Courts’ Interpretations of “Protected Computer”
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B)
The text of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) draws on Congress’s commerce
power, which is expressly enumerated in the Constitution.103  The Constitu-
tion allows for Congress to regulate commerce in three different ways: (1)
with foreign nations, (2) among the several states, and (3) with the Indian
tribes.104  In enacting the CFAA, Congress relied on the first two ways, as
§ 1030(e)(2)(B) contains the phrase “which is used in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce.”105  Throughout history, Congress has used these magic
words to trigger the commerce power and enact all sorts of regulation.106  It
has then been up to the courts to determine whether the substance of the
regulation actually affects interstate or foreign commerce, just as the
Supreme Court did in Wickard and Gonzales.107  Both the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits have heard constitutional arguments with regard to the CFAA, where
the defendants have argued that the computer system at issue did not affect
interstate commerce enough for it to be within Congress’s reach.
The defendant in Mitra (discussed above) challenged the CFAA on con-
stitutional grounds before the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the radio com-
munication system at issue was beyond the reach of the commerce power.108
Again, in this case, the court did not respond well to the crux of Rajib Mitra’s
argument, which rested on his belief that “Congress [could not] have con-
templated such breadth.”109  The court remained steadfast in its firm
approach to interpret the text of the law, rather than “the cerebrations of
those who voted for or signed it into law.”110  Turning to the radio communi-
cation system’s effect on commerce, the system was not connected to the
103 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
104 Id.
105 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2012) (emphases added).
106 The first Commerce Clause case before the Court was Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824).  Most recently, the Court analyzed the scope of the commerce power in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
107 See supra Section I.C.
108 United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005).
109 Id.
110 Id.
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internet, but it was networked in another way.  As the court explained, “[t]he
system operated on [a] spectrum licensed by the FCC.”111  The court con-
cluded that, for this reason, Mitra’s interference with the system affected
interstate “communication.”112  Still, Mitra contended that his interference
had no effect on any radio system in any other state.113  Responding to this
point, the court clarified the framework of the Commerce Clause analysis,
explaining how, with regard to the CFAA, it is not the actor who must affect
interstate commerce but the computer itself.114  And after Wickard and Gon-
zales, it is settled that “[o]nce the computer is used in interstate commerce,
Congress has the power to protect it from a local hammer blow, or from a
local data packet that sends it haywire.”115  Mitra attempted to push his case
one step further by hypothetically conceding that the radio communication
system was a “protected computer,” but arguing that to punish him would
violate his due process rights because he was not put on reasonable notice of
the Act’s breadth.116  But the court promptly shut down this position,
explaining that the Act was applied to him as written and that “[t]here is no
constitutional obstacle to enforcing broad but clear statutes.”117
Although the defendant in Kramer did not make constitutional argu-
ments in his case,118 the Eighth Circuit heard this same sort of pushback
from a defendant in another case, United States v. Trotter.119  In Trotter, which
came before the court in 2007, the defendant argued that a nonprofit organi-
zation’s computer network did not affect interstate commerce enough for
Congress to regulate it.120  John Trotter pled guilty to his charge of inten-
tionally causing damage to a protected computer without authorization, but
he reserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of the CFAA as
applied to him.121  As background, Trotter interfered with the Salvation
111 Id. at 496.
112 Id. Note that the Seventh Circuit explicitly chose to call out the effect on “commu-
nication” rather than “commerce” (likely because the spectrum involved here was licensed
by the Federal Communications Commission). See id. Also, the text of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(e)(2)(B) does mention both “commerce” and “communication,” though all activi-




116 Id. The court clarifies the holdings from other cases, which have said that “a court
may not apply a clear criminal statute in a way that a reader could not anticipate, or put a
vague criminal statute to a new and unexpected use.” Id.
117 Id.  However, Professor Orin Kerr has argued that perhaps the CFAA should be
rendered void for vagueness, which is in part due to its overbreadth, which is only
expanding. See generally Kerr, supra note 26.  Therefore, it is possible that Mitra’s argument
could have had merit, perhaps if it had been framed another way or presented in front of a
different U.S. court of appeals.
118 See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
119 478 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
120 Id. at 919.
121 Id.  Therefore, the constitutionality of the Act as applied was the sole issue on
appeal. See id.
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Army’s computer network in all sorts of ways after the Salvation Army fired
him.122  He was not very sneaky about it; around the time of the hackings,
several Salvation Army employees received pop-up messages saying “Trotter
was here.”123  While Trotter admitted to his conduct, he complained, similar
to Mitra, that “[n]early all computers [these] days are used someway in inter-
state commerce through the [I]nternet or private networks.”124  Given this,
he thought the Act could not “possibly be so broad as to cover the computer
network of a not-for-profit organization like the Salvation Army.”125  The
court rejected this argument, largely relying on the fact that the computers
were connected to the internet, which Trotter himself admitted.126  Essen-
tially, the computers’ connection to the internet was determinative on this
issue, as it made the computers “part of ‘a system that is inexorably inter-
twined with interstate commerce’ and thus properly within the realm of Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause power.”127  Before making its ruling, the court also
pointed out that the nature of the attacked organization (here, the Salvation
Army as a not-for-profit entity) and the location of the attack (likely all within
Missouri) had no bearing on whether the computers affected interstate com-
merce.128  In other words, it is the computers themselves that must affect
interstate (or foreign) commerce—not the actor, the victim, or the attack.
Neither the Seventh Circuit nor the Eighth Circuit responded well to the
defendants’ arguments with regard to overbreadth.  Both Mitra and Trotter
thought it would be unfair to import nontraditional computer systems (i.e., a
radio communication system and a nonprofit’s computer system) into the
definition of “protected computer.”  However, both of their arguments
hinged on what the legislature would have intended, rather than the text of
the law, which caused them to fail.  Trotter’s case was especially uncompel-
ling because the Salvation Army computer system was connected to the
internet—which the Eighth Circuit found to definitively implicate interstate
commerce.  Mitra also faced an uphill battle because a federal government
agency (the FCC) licensed the communication spectrum for the radio sys-
tem, and the text of § 1030(e)(2)(B) explicitly mentions an effect on inter-
state or foreign commerce or communication.  Ultimately, it would seem that
any computer that affects communication would also affect commerce,
though that would make the word “communication” surplusage in this provi-
sion.  Although it is unclear why Congress included both “commerce” and
“communication” in the definition, including both words is unlikely to have
any legal implication given the breadth of the commerce power.
122 See id. at 919–20.
123 See id. at 920.
124 Id. at 921 (alterations in original).
125 Id.
126 See id.  The court quoted a decision from the Third Circuit, which posited that “the
Internet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce.” Id. (quoting United
States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006)).
127 See id. (quoting MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245).
128 See id. at 921–22.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE CFAA TO VOTING MACHINES
Given Russia’s interference with the 2016 U.S. election and the looming
threat of continued Russian cyber interference,129 the United States must
ensure that its election systems are secure and that it can deter and punish
any hackers.  Because the CFAA has been the United States’ principal tool in
criminalizing cyberattacks,130 it is critical to understand whether the hacking
of electronic voting machines falls within the scope of the CFAA.  Though
the DOJ’s Cyber-Digital Task Force asserted that such conduct would not be
covered by the CFAA,131 this Part reaches the opposite conclusion after care-
fully applying the hacking of voting machines to the key parts of the Act:
§ 1030(a), § 1030(e)(1), and § 1030(e)(2)(B).  It seems that the crux of the
Task Force’s argument is that voting machines are not protected because
they do not have internet and, as a result, do not meet the “affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce” requirement under § 1030(e)(2)(B).  However,
as discussed below, this argument should fail because most voting machines
are still networked to a centralized election-management system, which is
what makes them capable of being hacked and what causes them to affect
interstate commerce.
A. Voting Machine Hacking Certainly Falls Within 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)
Broadly speaking, the purpose of the CFAA is to prevent “fraud and
related activity in connection with computers.”132  The intentional hacking
of a voting machine to manipulate election results is obviously fraudulent.
The first definition of “fraud” under Black’s Law Dictionary is “[a] knowing
misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce
another to act to his or her detriment.”133  Hacking a voting machine
involves a knowing misrepresentation (the hacker knowingly manipulates
votes) of a material fact (votes have a substantial effect on political outcomes)
made to induce another to act to his or her detriment (the government
would be induced to present incorrect election results, which destroys the
integrity of the system).
Technically, Congress passed the roots of the CFAA in 1984 then passed
the CFAA itself in 1986.134  Perhaps unsurprisingly, around the time when
Congress began to regulate computer fraud is when electronic voting
machines first began coming into use.  James Narey, with the help of William
Saylor, patented the first model of the modern precinct-based optical scan
129 See Dan Coats Address, supra note 1.
130 See DOJ CYBER DIGITAL REPOrt, supra note 10, at 62.
131 See id. at 121.
132 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
133 Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  To further elaborate on the defini-
tion, the dictionary includes a quote from John Willard, in which he describes fraud as
“any kind of artifice by which another is deceived.” Id. (quoting JOHN WILLARD, A TREATISE ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 147 (Platt Potter ed., New York, Banks & Bros. 1879)).
134 See Tuma, supra note 19.
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systems in 1977.135  This type of system uses an optical scanner to read
marked paper ballots and tally the results; it is still used in elections today
(and will be more closely examined as a “computer” in Section III.B).
Nebraska was the first state to adopt an optical scan system as part of its elec-
tions, when several of its counties used the American Information Systems
Central-Count Ballot Tabulator in 1982.136  Five years later, in 1987, the R.F.
Shoup Corporation and Robert Boram patented the Shouptronic ELEC-
Tronic voting machine, which was “one of the first [push-button] direct
recording electronic voting machines to achieve significant commercial suc-
cess.”137  Though the innovation of electronic voting machines overlapping
with the time period in which Congress legislated the CFAA could be con-
strued as irrelevant to the CFAA’s legal application,138 this bit of information
might be used to rebut someone who argues that Congress could have never
foreseen the introduction of these devices and therefore could have never
intended the CFAA to apply to them.
As for the conduct of the hacking itself, it would be an insurmountable
stretch to conceive of a situation where the hacking of a voting machine does
not satisfy the “without authorization or exceeding authorized access”
requirement, especially in the context of Russia hacking U.S. election
devices.  Though the courts have struggled to understand what it means to
lack authorization, they certainly would have no trouble in deciding that the
cyber hacking of U.S. elections constitutes unauthorized conduct.  Although
both the Nosal and Citrin cases arose in the employment context, their hold-
ings still suggest this conclusion.  After all, the holding in Citrin implies that
an employee could be charged under the CFAA for violating an employer’s
computer-use policy—a laughable offense when compared to election hack-
ing.139  Relying on the rule of lenity, the Ninth Circuit held that the CFAA
does not extend to violations of an employer’s use policy.140  However, the
Ninth Circuit’s concern about a broad interpretation of the CFAA leading to
arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution has no bearing in this context;141
unauthorized hacking of an electronic voting machine is the exact type of
conduct that the CFAA was designed to prohibit.
B. Voting Machines Fall Within 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)
Up until this point, this Note has referred to voting machines generally
as if they were one uniform type of device.  However, this is not the case, and
135 Historical Timeline: Electronic Voting Machines and Related Voting Technology, PROCON
.ORG, https://votingmachines.procon.org/view.timeline.php?timelineID=000021 (last
updated July 22, 2013).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 A position both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits might take based on their respec-
tive decisions in Mitra and Trotter. See supra Section II.C.
139 See Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006).
140 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
141 See id. at 862.
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it is crucial to understand the full range of voting machine technology in
order to define the machines as “computers” under the CFAA.  That said,
both Mitra and Kramer demonstrated that satisfying the definition of “com-
puter” is a fairly simple step,142 and as a precursor to the following discus-
sion, it should be clear that all of the voting machine devices are “computers”
under the CFAA.  While this may be so, setting up what the “computers” are
will be key in guiding the analysis as to whether they are “protected.”  There
are three types of machines to be considered as “computers”: (1) the optical-
scan systems, (2) the direct recording electronic voting machines (“DREs”),
and (3) the centralized election-management systems.
The optical-scan systems and DREs are used on-site at polling locations,
and they are considered the two primary categories of voting machines.143
More than 350,000 of these types of machines are used in the United States
today.144  As mentioned in Section III.A, James Narey patented the first opti-
cal-scan system in 1977, and these systems are used to streamline the process
of scanning and tallying marked paper ballots.145  The R.F. Shoup Corpora-
tion launched the first DRE in 1987.146  This type of machine allows voters to
touch a screen or button to place their vote, and both the ballots and votes
are kept entirely digital.147  Most crucially:
With both kinds of voting systems, digital votes are stored on memory cards
or flash drives that are collected from machines after an election and are
supposed to be used for official results.  But many machines also have
embedded or externally connected modems to transmit unofficial results
rapidly on election night.148
This means that both the optical-scan systems and the DREs are “data
processing device[s] performing . . . storage functions,” and the both
“include[ ] . . . data storage facilit[ies],” all of which is language pulled
directly from § 1030(e)(1).149  The optical-scan system is of course an “opti-
cal” device, and the DRE is an “electronic” device.  Therefore, both of these
machines satisfy the definition of “computer” based on the objective text of
the Act, which is what the Seventh Circuit said must be considered.150  They
142 See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Mitra, 405
F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2005).




145 Historical Timeline: Electronic Voting Machines and Related Voting Technology, supra note
135.
146 Id.
147 Zetter, supra note 143.  While the process is made entirely digital with DREs, “some
DREs are outfitted with printers to produce a voter-verifiable paper trail.” Id.
148 Id.
149 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
150 See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005).
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both are devices that make use of an electronic data process, which for the
Eighth Circuit concludes the analysis.151
The optical-scan systems and DREs usually transmit their unofficial
results to the third type of machines: the centralized election-management
systems.  Often, the optical-scan systems and DREs are equipped with either
analog or cellular modems that send the unofficial results to these central
systems.152  The centralized election-management systems are used to
“receive results then check the signature to authenticate the data transmis-
sion.”153  The final votes are tallied by these systems.  Because these systems
make use of an electronic data process, and include both data storage facilities
and communications facilities, they are also “computers” under the definition
of the CFAA.
The above descriptions contain a handful of qualifiers such as “many,”
“usually,” and “most.”  This is because there is a general method that most
states follow in collecting and counting their votes, but specific device models
and tallying procedures vary across states, and even across counties within a
given state.154  For example, one of the more popular voting machine
devices is the DS200, an optical-scan system that is used in thirty-one states
and the District of Columbia.155  Even still, that means nineteen states do not
use the DS200, and of the states that use it, only Maryland, Maine, Rhode
Island, and the District of Columbia use exclusively DS200 machines state-
wide.156  All of this to say that if a hacking were to occur, it would be impor-
tant to first identify the exact type of systems that were hacked because there
is a range of possibilities.
C. Voting Machines Probably Fall Within 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B)
Though not every polling place uses the voting machines’ modems to
transmit results, most do, and it is the devices that transmit results by modem
that pose the greatest opportunity for infiltration by cyberhackers.157  There-
fore, at this point in the analysis, it should be assumed that the optical-scan
systems, DREs, and centralized election-management systems at issue are
ones that use embedded or externally connected modems.  It should also be
assumed, as the Cyber-Digital Task Force put forward in their report, that
151 See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2011).
152 Zetter, supra note 143.
153 Id.
154 See id.
155 Id. The DS200 is produced by Election Systems & Software, “[t]he top voting
machine maker in the country.” Id.
156 Id. Those using the DS200 statewide also have two other systems available for dis-
abled voters and absentee ballots. Id.
157 Id. For example, “Richard Rydecki, Wisconsin’s state elections supervisor, says
counties in his state decide individually whether to transmit election results.  Fred Wood-
hams, spokesman from the Michigan Department of State, said the same is true in his
state.” Id.
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these machines are not connected to the internet.158  To be sure, this Note
concedes that the transmission of results via analog or cellular modem is dis-
tinguishable from transmissions sent over the internet.  However, because
the voting machines are still networked (be it in a more secure environ-
ment), they should be considered to affect interstate commerce, thus meet-
ing the jurisdictional requirement laid out in § 1030(e)(2)(B).
Since the voting machines are not connected to the internet, they can-
not be said to definitively affect interstate commerce like the Salvation Army
computer network system in Trotter.159  The court in Trotter treated the
internet as both an “instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce,”
which makes computers connected to the internet fall squarely within Con-
gress’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.160  Conversely, the
highly secured modem transmissions made by voting machines are not “inex-
orably intertwined with interstate commerce” like the internet.161  Thus, the
Trotter decision leaves open the question of whether more securely hardened
network systems—like voting machines—also affect interstate commerce.
However, what is evident after Trotter is that, in conducting the interstate
commerce analysis, it should not matter that voting machines are operated
by local governmental officials.162  Though the localness of voting machine
operations could seem to remove the voting machines from interstate com-
merce, the Eighth Circuit made clear that “it is the characteristics of the com-
puter or computer network, not the entity using the network, that is the
focus of the statute.”163
The holding in Mitra proved that it is unnecessary for a “computer” to
be connected to the internet in order for it to affect interstate commerce.164
This case is very relevant given the Task Force’s assertion that voting
machines are not covered under the CFAA because they are not connected
to the internet.165  In Mitra, the Seventh Circuit found that a radio commu-
nication system affected interstate commerce because the system operated on
a spectrum licensed by the FCC and affected interstate “communication.”166
Furthermore, it was irrelevant that Mitra had only used the radio system in
one state because the system itself affected interstate commerce and there-
fore could be regulated locally.167  The largest contrast between voting
158 DOJ CYBER DIGITAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 121.
159 See United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
160 Id. at 921 (quoting United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3rd Cir. 2006)); see
also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (breaking down Congress’s power
to regulate interstate commerce into its ability to regulate channels of interstate com-
merce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce).
161 See Trotter, 478 F.3d at 921 (quoting MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245).
162 See id.
163 Id.
164 See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 493 (7th Cir. 2005).
165 DOJ CYBER DIGITAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 121.
166 See Mitra, 405 F.3d at 496.
167 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL410.txt unknown Seq: 21 23-MAY-19 14:54
2019] voting  machines  under  the  cfaa 1795
machines and the facts of Mitra is that the communication between voting
machine devices across modem lines is not regulated by a federal agency.
Rather, local government officials regulate this type of communication.168
While this discrepancy is unfavorable to the case for voting machines being
covered under the CFAA, it perhaps only means that the communication
between voting machines cannot be considered a channel or instrumentality
of interstate commerce.
This still leaves room for the communication between voting machines
to be an activity that “substantially affects interstate commerce.”169  Voting
machines, as the sum of component parts and technological development,
are a bit more complex than the simple commodity goods of wheat and mari-
juana, which were respectively scrutinized before the Supreme Court in the
Commerce Clause cases of Wickard and Gonzales.  Despite the factual differ-
ence, those cases stand for a relevant proposition: an activity that only places
indirect effects on interstate commerce can still be regulated by Congress
under the commerce power.170  Applying that test here, while borrowing
some of the language from Gonzales, the hacking of a local county’s election
would tend to frustrate the federal interest in eliminating election fraud in
the interstate market in its entirety.171  As to the “interstate market in its
entirety” in this context, the voting machine industry is currently dominated
by three privately held companies: Dominion Voting Systems Corporation,
Election Systems & Software, and Hart InterCivic.172  If a hacker were to infil-
trate a local election in a county using Dominion’s products, that could have
grave effects on Dominion’s overall business and thus affect the entire inter-
state market for voting machines because other local counties (across state
lines) using Dominion products would probably lose trust in Dominion’s sys-
tem and switch vendors.  On top of that, Dominion’s suppliers would stand to
lose a customer account.
Overall, because the voting machines are networked via modem lines,
they have the potential to be hacked, and even a purely local hacking could
substantially affect the interstate market.  This satisfies the interstate com-
merce requirement, as laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
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CONCLUSION
On the whole, there is a strong case for voting machines (at least those
networked in some way, which are most of them) to be covered under the
CFAA.  Although it might seem safer to expressly add voting machines to the
scope of the CFAA through another amendment, this solution is not a worka-
ble one.  The hacking of a voting machine clearly satisfies § 1030(a) and
§ 1030(e)(1).  The heart of the issue is whether this conduct satisfies
§ 1030(e)(2)(B).  Right now, § 1030(e)(2)(B) invokes the full breadth of
Congress’s commerce power.  That said, even if “protected computers” were
to expressly include voting machines, a defendant could still argue that this
amendment should be void for being outside the scope of the commerce
power.  A better fallback option would be for state and local governments to
create laws within the scope of their police power to protect elections from
fraud.  But hypothetically, if Russia were to hack California’s voting machines
in the next presidential election (and successfully change the national
result), the burden, it seems, should fall on the federal system to prosecute
the hackers, rather than on California’s state system alone.
Obviously, the conclusion that voting machines are covered under the
CFAA is only doing more to expand the CFAA’s scope.  From one angle, this
is positive because there is a need for cybercrime laws to be flexible given
how rapidly technology continues to change.  Particularly here, the nation
has a compelling interest in having the CFAA at its disposal in combating
election fraud, given the CFAA’s role as the “principal tool for prosecuting
computer crimes.”173  But looked at in another way, the CFAA is perhaps
becoming too broad for its own good.  Along with more breadth comes more
discretion given to to judges and juries, which tends to lead to arbitrary and
discriminatory prosecutions.
The good news is that the voting machine devices have yet to be directly
hacked by Russia.  Although Russia may only continue to interfere with elec-
tions in other ways (like their dissemination of fake ad campaigns on social
media), it is impossible to know exactly what they are capable of doing.  As
Dan Coats said, “the warning lights are blinking red again.”174  Given the
dangerous level of threat, an attack on U.S. voting machines might be one of
Russia’s next moves in its ongoing cyber warfare.  In the aftermath, the DOJ
should have the CFAA at its disposal to restore justice.
If that time does come, consider this Note a ballot cast: voting machines
are “protected computers.”
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